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The activities of several prominent members of the Muslim League in relation to the Tahuffuz-i-khatm-i-nubuwwat movement and the consequent disturbances have been detailed in an earlier part of this report. It is necessary here merely to recapitulate the main incidents connected with the Muslim League or individual members or office-bearers of the Muslim League who were subject to the party discipline. It will be remembered that during the period under review Mian Abdul Bari was the President of the Provincial Muslim League from 16th April 1949 to 20th August 1950, Sufi Abdul Hamid from 20th August 1950 to 28th October 1951 and Mr. Daultana since 27th October 1951. After the Mamdot Ministry was dismissed, Mian Abdul Bari nominated some leaders of the Muslim League as Advisers to the Governor during the time that section 92-A was in force. Though the responsibility for Provincial administration was that of the Governor, who was acting on-behalf of the Governor-General, the Governor followed the same practice as is followed when a popular Ministry is in office. The Advisers, therefore, occupied the same position as that of the Ministers. Malik Muhammad Anwar was the Adviser in charge of law and order from 4th November 1949 to 24th July 1950.
Though by the Press Statement of Mr. Daultana of 1st April 1952 and the directions issued in pursuance of that statement to the League organisations on 3rd April 1952 members of the Muslim League were prohibited from presiding over non-Muslim League meetings, and they were directed not to take any part in activities which might create estrangement or enmity between different classes of Pakistan citizens, none of the League organisations took these instructions to mean that its members were not to take part in activities connected with the Tahaffuz-i-khatm-i-nubuwwat movement. The instructions had excluded functions of a purely social or non-political nature, and though it was pointed out that the word ‘political’ was to be interpreted strictly and not loosely, the members of the Muslim League in several districts began to associate themselves whole-heartedly with the Tahaffuz-i-khatm-i-nubuwwat movement. Nor was the direction that members of the Muslim League should not take any part in activities which might create estrangement or enmity between different classes of Pakistan subjects, seriously taken and the office-holders and members of the League as well as members of the Legislative Assembly who had been elected on the League ticket, began freely to take part in activities in support of the movement. No notice of these activities, if they ever came to the notice of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, was taken, and inquiries made by some members evoked no definite reply. In its meeting held on 17th July 1952, the City Muslim League of Gujranwala passed a resolution declaring that khatm-i-nubuwwat was a fundamental doctrine in Islam, disapproving of the application of orders under section 144 to mosques, characterising such orders as an interference in religion and demanding the Government not only to withdraw those orders but also to withdraw all cases arising out of their contravention. The resolution of the City Muslim League, Gujranwala, was followed by the resolution of the City Muslim League, Sargodha, on 20th July to the effect that the Ahmadis be declared a non-Muslim minority and requesting the Provincial Muslim League and the All Pakistan Muslim League to take practical steps to obtain such declaration. In a similar resolution the City Muslim League, Kamoke, declared the Qadianis to be ineligible for membership of the League and asked for their rustication from that body. The important Leaguers who associated themselves with resolutions relating to the declaration of Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority, which were submitted to the Working Committee of the Provincial Muslim League for the annual meeting that was to be held on 26th and 27th July 1962, were:—
These resolutions were examined by the Chairman, Mr. Daultana, and other office-bearers, and though it is not known who proposed or drafted the resolution which was moved at the second session of the Council on 27th July, Mr. Daultana has taken full responsibility for that resolution. The resolution, which was passed by an overwhelming majority of 284 to 8, recited that differences between the Musalmans and the Qadianis on the doctrine of khatm-i-nubuwwat were fundamental, that owing to these differences a proposal had been put forward to class the Qadianis as a non-Muslim minority in the constitution of Pakistan, that this proposal reflected to a certain extent the reaction of Muslims to the strong separatist tendencies which the Qadianis themselves had shown in religious matters and other spheres of civic and social life, that the proposal involved grave and important issues of a constitutional and legal nature which required deep and careful consideration and could, with the fullest confidence, be left to the mature judgment of the leadership of the Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, that in the meantime every member of Muslim League must endeavour to create an atmosphere of calmness and serenity in which alone deliberate decisions affecting fundamental constitutional policy could be taken and that the Council affirmed its unwavering adherence to the principle that it was not only a democratic but also a religious duty of Muslims of Pakistan to protect the life, property, honour and all civic rights of every citizen of the State irrespective of his or her caste or creed. The view underlying this resolution had been explained earlier by Mr. Daultana in his speech at the Sialkot District Muslim League Conference at Pasrur, and after the passing of the resolution he further clarified it in his speeches in Hazuri Bagh, Lahore, on 30th August and at Rawalpindi on 13th September. In each of these speeches Mr. Daultana emphasised his and all Muslims’ belief in the finality of prophethood and the consequences of disbelief in that doctrine, the nature of the demands that followed from or were based on that doctrine, and the position that the demands were of a constitutional nature which were only cognisable by the Centre. Of course in those speeches he emphasised the fact that religious minorities in Pakistan were entitled to protection of life, property and honour. The resolution and the speeches show as clearly and unequivocally as words can that the Muslim League and Mr. Daultana personally considered the Qadianis to be non-Muslims because no other conclusion is possible from his speech in Hazuri Bagh when he said that the raising of any argument on the doctrine of khatm-i-nubuwwat itself amounted to kufr, that khatm-i-nubuwwat was a part of our faith which was above all argument and logic, and that the Qadianis, because of their separatist tendencies, were themselves responsible for the strong feeling that had come to exist against them. The same is the conclusion to be drawn from his speech at Rawalpindi. In his speech at Nizamabad on 25th October to the District Muslim League, Gujranwala, there was a veiled hint that there were some people who were creating disunity among the Musalmans and that such people were destroying not only the unity of Islam but the integrity of Pakistan, but, keeping in view his earlier pronouncements, this could not have referred to the differences of Musalmans with the Ahmadis who, according to his earlier speeches, were clearly outside the pale of Islam.
The second point that clearly emerged from the resolution and the speeches was that the demands in respect of the Ahmadis were in their nature essentially constitutional and that, therefore, they were exclusively within the cognizance of the Central authorities, i.e., the All Pakistan Muslim League, the Central Government and the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Mr. Daultana must have been fully conscious of the implications of this statement of the position. In the language of the resolution and the words and expressions he used in the speeches which he made on the subject, one thing was most clearly expressed and that is that the Province was not concerned with the demands except in their law and order aspect and that it was the Centre alone who could take notice of the demands and take necessary steps to have them recognised. After this no one could have dared to say that the Ahmadis were not a separate community, that they were within the fold of Islam, that the demands against them were unfounded and unjustified and that they should be rejected. The demands having thus been held to be justified, thereafter all representations and claims in reference to them had to be made to the Centre and all activities in support or to secure recognition of the demands to be directed against the Central authorities, i.e., Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din, the leader of All Pakistan Muslim League and the Prime Minister of Pakistan who could, if he liked, carry the demands through the party meeting and thus through the Constituent Assembly. Things, therefore, took the course pointed out and Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din began to feel himself in an uncomfortable position, a position in which Mr. Daultana would have found himself if the demands had related to the Provincial sphere. The centre of activity shifted to Karachi where deputation after deputation of the ulama began to call upon Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din and to discuss the demands with him. A detailed account of his interviews with the ulama and what transpired at them has been given earlier. Intensely religious, and a man of deep and sincere convictions as Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din is, he found himself placed on the horns of a dilemma. He could not refute the argument of the learned theologians which was in keeping with his own beliefs. He also knew the power that the ulama, since the Quaid-i-Azam’s demise, the passing of the Objectives Resolution and the recommendation of the Basic Principles Committee, had acquired in the land. The rejection of the demands would have brought him, as he has himself put it, to a “head-on clash” with the ulama, and this he wished to avoid at every cost. He could not have accepted the demands as it would certainly have exposed Pakistan to ridicule and disillusioned the international world of her claims as an advancing, progressive and democratic State. All attempts to temporise and compromise failed. Though the issue was clear-cut, it contained in it implications of so dangerous and radical a character that any definite decision one way or the other would have meant trouble for him.
Who put Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din in this unhappy position? The answer must certainly be that it was the Muslim League resolution and its subsequent exposition and explanation. After the existence and justification of demands was officially recognised by the League, and their constitutional nature affirmed and explained, the course of the agitation was bound to be diverted to Karachi. The members of the Provincial Muslim League could hereafter be indifferent, and if they so liked, could even openly espouse the cause, for which a clear case had been made out in the League resolution itself. The result, therefore, was that members of the Muslim League began unreservedly to pronounce their support of the demands. In the spate of posters and handbills which began to appear in favour of the demands, the names of important office-bearers of the League and Muslim League M. L. As. began prominently to be mentioned. In the month of July alone five such posters were published. One of these with the heading: “On the issue of khatm-i-nubuwwat every Musalman will shed his last drop of blood”, issued by the Publicity Department of Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam, Lyallpur, appeared over the signatures of Chaudhri Aziz-ud-Din, M. L. A., President, District Muslim League, Lyallpur, and Member Working Committee of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, Sheikh Bashir Ahmad, President, City Muslim League, Lyallpur, and four other Muslim League, M.L.As. Another, published by Idara-i-Tahaffuz-i-Khatm-i-Nubuwwat, which demanded the release of persons arrested in the movement and an inquiry into the circumstances which resulted in the death of the ‘martyrs of Multan’, was subscribed by Dr. Ali Muhammad, President, Muslim League, Sumundri, Chaudhri Ali Sher, General Secretary, Muslim League, Samundri, Sheikh Muhammad Alam, Councillor District Muslim League, Lyallpur, Hakim Munsif Ali, Member Working Committee, Muslim League, Lyallpur, Chaudhri Khuda Bakhsh, Member Working Committee, Muslim League, Samundri, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali Mujahid, Samundri, Chaudhri Muhammad Yaqub, Samundri, and Chaudhri Inayat Ullah, Samundri. The third poster was signed by Muhammad Ashiq Khan, General Secretary, City Muslim League, Qasur, Sayyad Hasan Ali Shah Hamdani, Councillor, City Muslim League, Qasur, and Mian Khadim Husain, Member Muslim League, Qasur. Similarly a poster published in Jhang was signed by Hakim Muhammad Ain-ul-Haq, Secretary, Primary Muslim League, Maghiana, Mian Gul Muhammad, Member Working Committee Muslim League, Maghiana, Hafiz Zafar Ahmad, Member Working Committee Muslim League, Maghiana, Hakim Abbas Ali Khan, Member Working Committee Muslim League, Maghiana, Sayyad Muhammad Sibtain, Member Working Committee Muslim League, Maghiana, Sayyad Ghulam Abbas Ali Shah, President. Primary Muslim League of Village Jhirki, Haji Allah Jowaya, Councillor City Muslim League, Maghiana, Master Allah Ditta, Councillor, Muslim League, Maghiana, Mian Ghulam Qadir, Member Muslim League, Maghiana, Master Ghulam Nabi, Senior President, Muslim League, Maghiana, Mian Nazir Hussain, Councillor City Muslim League, Maghiana, Mian Ahmad Din, Treasurer, Muslim League, Maghiana., Chaudhri Dost Muhammad, Member Muslim League, Maghiana, Mian Amir Bakhsh, Joint Secretary, Muslim League, Maghiana, Mian Khadim Hussain, Salar District Muslim League, Jhang, and Mian Rahmat Ullah, Convener, Primary Muslim League, Maghiana. The poster published by Majlis-i-Tahaffuz-i-Khatm-i Nubuwwat, Sheikhupura, under the heading “Unanimous Demands” and signed by Ata Muhammad, Khair Din Chishti, Mahbub Ilahi, Muhammad Sharif, Muhammad Aslam, Abdur Rahim, Amin Gilani, Nasir Qureshi and Ch. Mushtaq Ahmad, Members of the Working Committee and Councillors of the City Muslim League, Sheikhupura, supported the demands, declared the promulgation of orders under section 144 as interference with religion and demanded their withdrawal. Another poster by the same body and on the same subject was signed by Chaudhri Abdul Ghani, M. L. A., Councillor, Pakistan Muslim League, Haji Muhammad Ali, M. L. A., Chaudhri Lal Khan, President, District Muslim League, Sheikhupura, and Chaudhri Muhammad Ibrahim, President, City Muslim League, Sheikhupura.
Members of the Muslim League took active part in the collection of funds and the enrolment of volunteers and some of them became dictators or members of the direct action committees in districts and when the disturbances started, they jumped whole-heartedly into the movement.
As many as 377 members of the Muslim League joined the agitation. Their particulars are given in a list prepared by Mr. Muhammad Husain, Superintendent of Police, compiled from official information received from the districts. With the exception of Mianwali every district seems to have been affected. The following statement would show the number of members affected in each district:—
These gentlemen took part in processions, leading violent mobs, violating orders promulgated under section 144 and collecting funds with a view to financing the movement. Among the persons in this list are presidents, senior vice-presidents, secretaries, treasurers and other office-bearers of the various Muslim League organisations in the Province. Four of them were Councillors of the Provincial Muslim League, five were members of the Muslim National Guards, two were Advocates, and one the editor of an Urdu daily. Fifty-four of them were arrested under section 3 (3) and six under section 21 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, eleven under section 188 of the Pakistan Penal Code, six under Martial Law Regulations, two in cases of loot, arson and murder, and one under sections 124-A and 153-A of the Pakistan Penal Code. Two of them absconded while one was let off with a warning. One, who was a lambardar, was dismissed from his office while the licence of another for possession of a revolver was suspended.
The Provincial organisation looked at all these activities with perfect equanimity and no evidence is to be found anywhere in the bulky record before us of that organisation’s disapproval of such activities. In fact, there are suggestions made from several quarters that the movement had the Provincial organisation’s support and encouragement.
The demands, though they related to the Ahmadis, were against the Government. Now the Government in power in those days, as it is at present, was the Muslim League Government. How persons subject to the discipline of the Muslim League could take part in such a movement or in the direct action campaign that was subsequently launched, is beyond our sense of propriety and decency to comprehend and no attempt has been made to explain this apparent act of indiscipline and disloyalty to that organisation. The Gujranwala and Sargodha incidents are typical in this respect, and we endeavoured to obtain an explanation of the conduct of some Muslim Leaguers of these places. The result of our effort is reproduced below.
The Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala says the following in his written statement:—
Mr. Manzur Hasan is a member of the Legislative Assembly, having been elected to that body on the Muslim League ticket, and is the Secretary of the City Muslim League, Gujranwala. He is an Advocate and in that capacity had defended the accused who were prosecuted for their contravention of orders under section 144 prohibiting public assemblies in mosques which were not of a religious nature. As has been pointed out earlier, on 20th June 1952 some prominent Ahrar leaders addressed a public meeting in Sheranwala Bagh Mosque, Gujranwala after the Juma prayers. This meeting had been proclaimed a day before in the manner in which public meetings are announced and was held after Juma prayers had finished. In a meeting of the City Muslim League, Gujranwala, Mr. Manzur Hasan had moved the resolution which demanded the release of the persons who had been arrested for organising or speaking at the public meeting held after the Juma prayers on 20th June and for the withdrawal of orders under section 144. He was called as the 79th witness in the inquiry and the relevant part of his statement is as follows :—
Mr. Aftab Ahmad, President, City Muslim League, Gujranwala, deposed as follows:—
Qazi Murid Ahmad is a member of the Legislative Assembly, having been elected on the Muslim League ticket. He is also a member of the Council of All Pakistan Muslim League, His status will be apparent from the following answers to the questions put by us:—
The witness was the President of the Majlis-i-Amal of Sargodha and took active part in the agitation, even after the programme under the resolution of ‘direct action’ had begun, for which he was arrested. The witness collected subscriptions for the Majlis-i-Amal and made some very strong speeches in favour of the demands and against the Government. The sort of things that he said at these meetings are reproduced below:—
Referring to officers in that speech he said they were all disciples of the British and immoral. They gambled and they drank. “I once mentioned to Mr. Noon, the Chief Minister”, he said, “that the Deputy Commissioner of a district gambles all night and doses during the day in Court. This representative of twelve lacs of people is a gambler and an adulterer. He has a depraved character but is Sahib Bahadur. Nothing was done on this complaint.”
To continue with his evidence in Court:—
Now the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence of these three persons are these. In the City Muslim League, Gujranwala, there are two rival groups, namely, the party of Mr. Aftab Ahmad and Mr. Manzur Hasan and the party of Sheikh Barkat Ali and Sheikh Muhammad Ashiq. The first party is in power and, reading between the lines, wishes to acquire control in the administration of the district. The second party which is not in power in the League but is in favour with the district officers wishes to oust the first party. Therefore, the first party in order to maintain itself in power must do something to enlist popular support, and could there be any better occasion for this party to make itself popular than khatm-i-nubuwwat and the consequent agitation against the Ahmadis? This party, therefore, considers it quite right to condemn the Government for having promulgated orders under section 144 to ban public meetings in mosques; it considers persons accused of having contravened such orders as heroes and demands, their immediate release; and it demands of the Government to withdraw those orders because they amount to interference in religion. In other words the City League instead of supporting the Muslim League Government and explaining to the people that mosques were being defiled by their being converted into places of public meetings by a political party opposed to the League, decides to condemn the Government because such condemnation was expected to make the party in power more popular and to defeat the designs of its opponent. For that purpose Mr. Manzur Hasan, the Secretary of the City League, would sign the Ahrar pledge, collect funds, lead processions and engage in every other activity under the programme of direct action. We don’t believe a word of this witness when he says that he did all these things under duress.
Qazi Murid Ahmad was a nonentity in Sargodha, paying no income-tax and owning only twenty kanals of land. Anyhow, the Muslim League had him elected to the Legislative Assembly. Being thus a creature of the Muslim League, he considers nothing improper in his becoming a dictator of the district council of action and leading in his district a revolt against the Muslim League Government. Nor does he feel anything unbecoming in his collecting a large gathering around him and jeering at the Prime Minister of Pakistan and his wife and abusing everybody in office. Such things are justified to him in the name of khatm- i-nubuwwat.
The part which is proved to have been taken by the Muslim Leaguers, both before and after the commencement of the disturbances, is not at all surprising. In fact, such activities on the part of the members of the Muslim League were a natural consequence of the Muslim League resolution and the speeches made by the President of the Provincial Muslim League. The word ‘canalise’ has been used in the evidence in reference to the activities of Mir Nur Ahmad, Director of Public Relations, but it can be used quite aptly to describe the effect of the Provincial Muslim League resolution and its repeated exposition in speeches and newspapers. When ceaseless propaganda in the press in favour of the demands and emphasis therein on their constitutional nature came to the notice of Dr. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, who happened to be on a visit to Lahore in July, 1952, and it was complained to him that this propaganda was being carried on in newspapers which had received large sums of money from Government and that the propaganda was being carried on by Mir Nur Ahmad, he sent for this officer who admitted before him that his object in doing what he had been doing was to ‘canalise’ the movement. This admission, though denied by Mir Nur Ahmad, must be held to be proved, and the only meaning that can possibly be attached to this quaint metaphor is that Mir Nur Ahmad had created a channel for the movement to run in and that the natural flow of this channel could only be towards Karachi, because Karachi was the centre both of All Pakistan Muslim League and the Central Government. All the evidence, oral as well as documentary, of which there is a mass, including numerous articles from newspapers and speeches, shows that, after the Muslim League’s resolution of 27th July, every one interested in the movement had come fully to comprehend the constitutional position that propaganda in the Provinces was useless and that unless the demands were brought in the regular manner before the Constituent Assembly, no tangible result could be expected from the agitation. All the energies of the parties, who were clamouring for the acceptance of the demands, were, therefore, diverted to the Central Government of which Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din was the head. If, therefore, Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din found himself unable to accept the demands, with the result that ‘direct action’ had to be resorted to and the disturbances broke out, the responsibility for what happened must as clearly be put on the Muslim League as on the All Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention which had formulated the demands and presented them to Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din at the point of pistol. During all this period, nothing was done by the Muslim League or any of its leaders to resist the movement or to offer to the people any counter-ideology. On the other hand, the Muslim League by its resolution had committed itself in such an irrevocable manner that, without bringing itself into utter contempt and unpopularity, it could not have subsequently gone back upon the view that it had formally expressed in its resolution and of which the best exponent was the President of the League himself. We have not the slightest doubt that there was more than one convincing reply to all this fuss and that if the Muslim League leaders had been able fully to comprehend the consequences following from the demands and had the capacity and the desire to save the Province from disgrace and ruination, they would have been able to do so. The Gujranwala and the Sargodha prosecutions and the Kup incident were object lessons, which, if properly taught, would have opened the public eye and weaned away people from an agitation that was being carried on by a few political adventurers to defeat the Government. We believe that our common man is essentially sound and that, though he is, as other people in the world are, religiously disposed, perhaps more than anyone else in the world, he is capable of understanding things in their true perspective if those things are properly placed before him. Honest and patriotic citizen of a new State as he is, he would have listened to our leaders if any effort had been made to explain to him the dangerous possibilities that underlay the current of popular feeling which had been aroused by a few politically frustrated men to wash their past sins. The man in the street could have understood, if properly told, that a political party, who were attempting to come into the field as a rival of the Muslim League, were using religion merely as a lever to raise themselves in the popular estimation and that they were making a fool of him. The Gujranwala and Sargodha contraventions of the order under section 144 were very apt illustrations of the manner in which religion was being exploited for political purposes. At Sargodha a regular public meeting had been held in a mosque on a Friday at 10 o’clock, and nothing more was needed than a challenge to the organisers of that meeting to show that Juma prayers could be said at 10 o’clock, with the name of the President of the meeting and the list of speakers having been previously and formally announced. The same had been the case in Gujranwala. This meeting also had been announced by posters and loudspeakers on the preceding day by the Ahrar; it had been stated in these announcements that Ahrar leaders whose names were mentioned were coming from different places to address the gathering. The meeting was again announced by a person while the khatib was delivering the Khutba, and it was actually held after Juma prayers were over. If any effort had been made by the leaders of the Muslim League to expose these tactics of the Ahrar, we have not the slightest doubt that people would have revised their attitude and understood and appreciated the Government’s view.
Repeated appeals to democratic principles were made before us by learned counsel of the parties and it was vehemently urged that the demands were unanimous and that in a democratic country when a particular demand has such strong and universal support, the Government is bound to accede to it, irrespective of the consequences of its acceptance. It was said that our political leaders, who are elected by popular suffrage, are in their present positions merely because people have put them there and that therefore they are bound to act as their voters require them to do. The same principle has been reiterated before us on behalf of the Ministry and the Muslim League and it has been urged that in a representative form of Government a political leader can be described to be a representative of the people only if he respects and carries into effect the feelings, prejudices and aspirations of the people. We think that it is a poor ideal for our leaders to adopt. In a country where the bulk of the people are uneducated and only a small percentage of them is literates a recognition of this position would lead to the disconcerting result that our leaders must remain an embodiment of popular ignorance and prejudices and completely devoid of higher ideals. Where the elector knows the value of his vote and has the requisite sense and intelligence to understand problems peculiar to his country and broad world events and currents and has a sufficiently developed mind to form a right judgment on all matters of national concern, the leader has got to abide by the popular judgment or quit his office. But in a country like ours, we have little doubt that the true function of the leaders is to lead the people and not throughout be driven by them, as Mr. Qurban Ali Khan rightly put it: “at the head of the herd all the time”. It was this fear of becoming unpopular if anything bold or courageous was done that was mainly responsible for a complete absence of the ideology that was necessary to resist or prevent the movement which by its apparently religious appeal so rapidly permeated the masses. We are, therefore, of the opinion that our leaders failed in their duty and that they found themselves completely unable to rise to the occasion which demanded foresight, wisdom and all the qualities of true statesmanship. Throughout the period not one popular leader dared appeal to the common sense of the citizen. Even when the conflagration was in its fury, not one of them condescended to talk to the people and to explain to them that they ware being misled to a course, the only immediate result of which could be the shattering of the country to pieces. The President of the Provincial Muslim League says that if it had depended on his will he would have done his beat to see that the demands were not raised because they were not fundamental in themselves nor immediately necessary and that it was inopportune to raise matters of domestic controversy till Pakistan was secure. But there is no evidence before us of any serious effort having been made to place this view before the public prior to the resolution of 27th July; nor is there any proof of any effort having been made to discourage or dissuade the Muslim League branches from giving prominence to this issue. On the contrary, the Provincial Muslim League itself called its annual meeting at an inopportune time and the President himself drew up the resolution that was adopted by the Councillors.
One more thing, which is of great importance, we must mention at this stage. By some peculiar arrangement, the principle of which we have not followed, the leader of the Provincial Muslim League is also the Chief Minister of the Province. It may, therefore, happen, and in this case it did happen, that the leader of the Muslim League was also incharge of the department of law and order. If the same man occupies two different positions, then it is inevitable that the decisions taken by him or his party on the political side should, if they have reference, direct or remote, to matters to be determined on the law and order side, influence his policy in the latter sphere. But the functions of a politicians are essentially different from an administrator. As a politician a person or party merely lays down the policy. An administrator, however, has to use, irrespective of any political considerations, the existing machinery of law in order to maintain peace and order and to repel all attacks on the safety of society. This point has been demonstrated in the inquiry to a degree which leaves no room for doubt that grave consequences may follow from such arrangements. One of the points mentioned in the election manifesto of the Muslim League was its abhorrence of the Punjab Public Safety Act and an undertaking by the League that this piece of legislation, which is generally supposed to be repressive, would be repealed. Now the Punjab Public Safety Act was enacted because in the existing circumstances abnormal legislation of this character was considered to be necessary, so that the executive may have sufficient reserve powers to act in an emergency, should it be pregnant with a serious threat to the public safety or the maintenance of order. Section 3 of that Act empowers the Government to detain a person if such course is considered by Government to be necessary to prevent the person concerned from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or public order. Section 5 of that Act, with the same object, enables the Government to make an order restricting the movements or activities of a person, including the order to restrain him from making public speeches. Section 6 of the Act gives to the Government extensive control on press and newspapers, but this control is only to be exercised to prevent a printer, publisher or editor of a newspaper from engaging in any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order. Section 12 empowers a District Magistrate to prohibit the holding of any processions or demonstrations in any public place, or any public meeting. Section 21 declares it to be a punishable offence for a person to make any speech or to publish any statement, rumour or report, if such speech or publication causes or is likely to cause fear or alarm to the public, or if it defames or is likely to defame any Government in Pakistan or any servant of the Crown or if it furthers or is likely to further any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order. Section 23 punishes the performance of any mock ceremony resembling any ceremony associated with or consequent upon death. Lastly, section 25 punishes a person who induces or attempts to induce any public servant or any servant of local authority to disregard or fail in his duties as such servant. These provisions of the Punjab Public Safety Act are in the nature of emergency legislation in the sense that they are to be used where the ordinary law fails and a grave danger to the peace and safety of the public is apprehended. The Act is intended to be used whenever a case for the use of these extraordinary powers exists because the ordinary law is insufficient to deal with the situation. Therefore, even though the Muslim League was against this piece of legislation, it was the duty of the leader of the League when he was incharge of law and order to use this extraordinary machinery if its use was considered by him to be necessary to remove any apprehended danger to public peace and order. Ever since the Ahmadi non-Ahmadi controversy began to assume the form of a threat to public peace and safety, action under one or the other provision of the Punjab Public Safety Act was recommended to the Ministry by officers who thought that recourse to such provisions was necessary, but when the matter came before the leader of the Muslim League in his capacity as Chief Minister of the Province, he took decisions which were dictated by the-Muslim League ideology, but which, looked upon from an administrative point of view, were wrong.
The record of the cases that were dealt with by the officers on the administrative side shows that recommendations were being made from time to time either to arrest a person under section 3 or to stop him from making speeches or to restrict his movements to a certain locality under section 5 or to prosecute him under section 21 for abusing high dignitaries of Government or for arranging their mock funerals, but the Punjab Public Safety Act was a hated Act to the politician and whenever any recommendation for taking action under that Act was made, it was looked upon with political spectacles and in the decisions taken the politician throughout dominated the administrator. An administrator in charge of law and order only looks at the law and order side of the step he is required to or wishes to take, while with the politician the first consideration is the effect of the proposed action on his own and his party’s popularity. An interesting illustration of this mentality is to be found in the view that the Adviser for law and order took on Mr. Anwar Ali’s recommendation of 30th December 1949 that certain Ahrar leaders be prosecuted under section 153-A of the Penal Code and section 21 of the Punjab Public Safety Act. Deciding against the proposed action Malik Muhammad Anwar, who was a politician, remarked that it was not advisable to take any action against the Ahrar “as the Muslims are very touchy on the point of Ahmadism and to prosecute the Ahrar for their vituperations against the Ahmadis would give them an air of martyrdom in the eyes of public which they do not deserve”. The same view was repeated by him subsequently, and Mr. Daultana throughout seems to have abhorred taking any action under the Punjab Public Safety Act where he thought that the action taken would be unpopular. In one of the cases he definitely ruled that he was not in favour of taking any action under the Punjab Public Safety Act and, thereafter, the officers to whom this Act came in handy for the preservation of public safety or the maintenance of public order ceased to bother themselves about it any longer. Now the principle of the politician, when he is acting as an administrator, that a certain action which is open under the law or which the exigencies of the case require to be taken under the law should not be taken because it would excite popular dissatisfaction, comes perilously near the proposition that if a murder is applauded by the public and the prosecution of the murderer would be resented by the public or would excite public sympathy with the accused, the murderer need not be punished. All suggestions or proposals for prosecution which came up before the Government in the course of the agitation appear to have been approached and decided on this principle. The case of contravention of orders under section 144 by organising public meetings in mosques is another instance. The Ahrar and the ulama could put up a plausible contention before the public that Government was prohibiting something being done in the mosques which was permitted or enjoined by their religion and that these orders of Government amounted to an encroachment on the religious rights of the people. We have already said that the allegation of interference with religion was false and an unfounded calumny on Government, but when no counter propaganda was done by Government agency to refute these allegations and the offenders became the object of public admiration and began to be considered as heroes, the Chief Minister concerned himself only with the possible reaction of this feeling on the position of the political party to which he belonged. And when the news of the Kup incident, in which the police had used force and caused some casualties, which use of force was subsequently found to be justified by a High Court Judge who held an inquiry into the incident, was received and public indignation over the incident gauged, the administrator completely surrendered himself to the politician and not only convicted offenders were released but pending cases and orders under section 144 were withdrawn, and after this no action of any kind seems to have been taken against the Ahrar or other agitators who were left free to carry on their propaganda in any form and to any extent that they liked. The result, therefore, was that beyond warnings, which time out of number were administered to the Ahrar till their repetition became a joke, many warnings having been administered by different officers to the same man on different occasions, no effective action of any sort was taken.
Several prosecutions under section 153-A and section 295-A of the Penal Code were also recommended by several officers, and there can be no two opinions that offences under these two sections were committed by the parties whose prosecution was proposed, but no prosecution was ever ordered or launched, though there was at a very late stage a cryptic order that where an offence under the ordinary law has been committed the offender may be prosecuted. The result of the omission to take strong and effective action against those who were spreading a volume of hatred against the Ahmadis and their leaders is obvious. Faith is a matter for the individual and however, false, dishonest or ridiculous it may appear to be to another, it may still be held sincerely and honestly by the person who professes it, and we have not the slightest reason to doubt that the Ahmadis hold the founder of their community and its subsequent leaders including the present head in deep reverence. Any attack on these personalities must, therefore, have deeply wounded the religious susceptibilities of the Ahmadis. There can also be no doubt that the extent of propaganda, involving abuse and ridicule, that was being carried on on such a large scale throughout the Province, must have caused the Ahmadis to be looked upon with despise and hatred. Therefore, omission to take action against those who were responsible for poisoning the public feeling against a small community can only be attributed to a desire to avoid the taking of some step which might excite public dissatisfaction, however deep and grievous the injury to that community may have been. And all this was due to the Muslim League and its leaders’ desire to remain popular with the masses and not to do anything which by its repercussions on the electorate might throw the League out of office.
The same desire prompted Mr. Daultana to issue his statement of 6th March 1953. That this statement was dishonest in the sense that it was no more than a political move taken in desperation to avert the imposition of Martial Law is admitted before us. The same is the conclusion to be drawn from the fact that subsequently this statement was withdrawn on 10th March by Mr. Daultana himself. Why was this statement then issued at all, and at a time when Mr. Daultana knew that the decision to impose Martial Law had either been actually taken or was about to be taken? The only answer can be that it was the desire to remain popular with the masses that dictated this step. Mr. Daultana did not give a moment’s thought to the implications of this statement and the extreme embarrassment that it was bound to cause, and did cause, to the Central Government, To whatever straits the Central Government might be put, thought Mr. Daultana, he himself should do something which might make him popular.